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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERALISM-AS AN INCIDENT OF
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, THE UNITED STATES HAS PARAMOUNT
RIGHTS AND POWER IN THE SEABED AND SUBSOIL OF THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF.
The United States brought suit against Maine and the 12 other Atlantic
Coast States alleging that these states had interfered with the federal govern-
ment's exclusive proprietary rights in the Continental Shelf seaward of the
three-mile marginal sea.' On motion by the defendant states, the Supreme
Court2 appointed a special master3 to determine the validity of the states'
historical claims to the disputed lands4 and adopted his findings.' Held, as an
I The suit was prompted in 1968 when Maine purported to lease some 3.3 million acres of
submerged lands in the Atlantic Ocean to King Resources of Denver. Taylor, The Settlement oJ
Disputes Between Federal and State Governments Concerning Offshore Petroleum Resources:
Accommodation or Adjudication? 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 358, 373 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Taylor].
The United States and most other littoral nations have traditionally exercised sovereignty over
a three-mile marginal belt, which starts at the low-water mark on the coast and extends seaward
for three marine miles. A marine mile is equivalent to about 1.15 geographical miles. Under the
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SLA], the coastal states now
own land under this marginal belt, but with two exceptions, their ownership extends only three
"geographical" miles from the coastal low-water mark. Hereinafter, when any reference is made
to the three-mile marginal belt, unless otherwise specified, the reference is to the geographical
three-mile belt established by the SLA. Additionally, when mention is made of the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf lands, the reference is to all land on the Continental Shelf seaward of this geographical
three-mile belt.
2 The United States had invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1251(b)(2) (1970).
The complaint alleged that the federal government's rights in the disputed land were paramount
and that "each of the [defendant] States claimed some right or title to the relevant area and was
interfering with the rights of the United States." The Atlantic States answered that the federal
government's rights in the area were not paramount, that the states' historical claims predominated
over the federal claim, and that the SLA preserved these claims.
The United States sought a declaratory judgment of its rights in the disputed lands and such
other relief as the Court deemed proper. The United States also demanded an accounting for all
sums that the states may have derived from the disputed area. However, the special master
recommended that this claim be denied for failure of proof, and the Supreme Court approved.
I The Court appointed the Honorable Albert B. Maris, Senior Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Judge Maris was given authority to request further pleadings, to summon witnesses, and to
take such evidence and submit such reports as he might deem appropriate.
I Since both the State of Florida and the United States took exceptions to the special master's
findings with respect to Florida's boundary, the Court made a separate determination of the issues
thereby raised in United States v. Florida, 95 S. Ct. 1162 (1975). Florida claimed the master should
have recognized that under the state's 1868 constitution, its boundaries extend beyond the limits
set forth in the SLA and that the Florida Keys and portions of the Straits of Florida are part of
the Gulf of Mexico, rather than of the Atlantic Ocean. However, the Court adopted the findings
of the special master. It referred the exceptions of the United States back to the special master
for consideration.
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incident of national external sovereignty, the United States has paramount
rights and power in the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean
seaward of the three-mile marginal sea to the outer edge of the Continental
Shelf. United States v. Maine, 95 S. Ct. 1155 (1975).
The Supreme Court recognized in many early cases that when the original
colonies gained independence from England they became separate sovereign
states endowed with England's former rights,6 including ownership of some
land under navigable waters within their boundaries.7 When the colonies en-
tered the Union, they retained ownership of these submerged lands,' and there-
after, all new states upon admission acquired similar ownership rights within
their own boundaries.' However, throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries,
the scope and extent of state ownership of submerged lands was largely a
matter of assumption. It was established in 1845, in the landmark case of
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,10 that the states owned land under navigable inland
waters and tidelands," but the Supreme Court's language therein was broad
enough to include land under navigable waters within a state's boundaries."2
I Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1894); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
367, 410 (1842).
' Appleby v. City of N.Y., 271 U.S. 364, 381 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 14-15
(1894); Munford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867); Den v. Jersey Co., 56 U.S. (15
How.) 426 (1853); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845); Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 418 (1842).
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see cases cited note 7 supra.
All new states were admitted on an "equal footing" with the original states. This provision
was first legislated in the Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States
Northwest of the River Ohio, passed by the Congress of the Confederation, 1787, reenacted, Ist
Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 (1789). Note, Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Title in
Submerged Lands on the Continental Shelf, 56 YALE L.J. 356, 358 n.15 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as Conflicting Claims].
Unlike the original states and Texas, new states did not possess sovereignty prior to admission
to the Union. The original states "retained" ownership of certain submerged lands. Since the
retention theory was unavailable to the new states, the "public trust" doctrine developed. Under
this theory the federal government held submerged lands under navigable waters in trust for the
future states. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); accord, Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1 (1894); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); State v. Black River
Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893). See generally MacGrady, Florida's Sovereignty
Submerged Lands: What Are They, Who Owns Them and Where Is the Boundary?, I FLA. STATE
UNIV. L. REV. 596, 597 (1973).
IC 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
"Inland waters are those over which a state may exercise full sovereignty as if the waters were
part of the land mass; for example, rivers, bays, and historic waters." Taylor, supra note I, at 359.
Tidelands are the lands between the high-water mark and low-water mark which are subject to
the ebb and flow of tides. Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22-23 (1935).
" "This right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under the navigable waters ...
belongs exclusively to the states within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and they, and they
only, have the constitutional power to exercise it." Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 230 (1845) (emphasis added). Note that the disputed land involved in Pollard was land under
inland waters.
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Consequently, the states assumed they owned land within their boundaries
which extended beyond the inland waters and tidelands into the ocean."3 The
federal government first disputed this assumption in 1937 when it claimed
ownership of all submerged lands within the "marine" three-mile belt seaward
of the tidelands.' 4 The resulting dispute" led in 1947 to United States v.
California" where the Court held that, irrespective of state boundaries, the
federal government possessed paramount rights in the land within this belt. 7
"1 Two other cases are usually cited by the states for the proposition that their ownership
extends into the marginal sea. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891), involved the
power of Massachusetts to regulate fishing. While the Court found that Massachusetts had such
power, no question was raised as to paramount rights in the open sea. In fact, the illegal fishing
charged by the state occurred in Massachusetts inland water. In the case of The Abby Dodge, 223
U.S. 166 (1912), the defendant was charged with landing sponges at a Florida port in violation of
an act of Congress (Act of June 20, 1906, ch. 3442, 34 Stat. 313), which regulated sponge fishing
in the Gulf of Mexico. The defendant challenged the statute as an infringement on the state's police
powers. The Court upheld the statute but construed it narrowly as not applying to waters within
the state boundary, presumably the three-mile belt. Since these cases involve the exercise of police
powers, they can be distinguished from the inquiry into proprietary rights. See Conflicting Claims,
supra note 9, at 361.
11 E. BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY 7, 101 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
BARTLEY]. A number of bills, the first being the Nye Bill, S. 2164, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937),
were introduced in Congress between 1937 and 1939. The bills attempted to declare that lands
seaward of the low-water mark of all coastal states were part of the public domain of the United
States. Not one was enacted. BARTLEY at 101-17.
11 During the 79th Congress (1945-1946), 19 joint resolutions, all in favor of state ownership of
submerged lands in the marginal sea, were brought before the House of Representatives. One
resolution, H.R.J. Res. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), passed both House and Senate but was
vetoed by President Truman, 92 CONG. REC. 10660 (1946), and the House failed to override the
veto, 92 CONG. REC. 10745 (1946). See Taylor, supra note I, at 361 n.18.
332 U.S. 19 (1947) [hereinafter cited as California]. The Court stated that:
The complaint alleges that the United States "is the owner in fee simple of, or
possessed of paramount rights in and powers over, the lands, minerals and other things
of value underlying the Pacific Ocean, lying seaward of the ordinary low water mark
on the coast of California and outside of the inland waters of the State, extending
seaward three nautical miles and bounded on the north and south, respectively, by the
northern and southern boundaries of the State of California."
Id. at 22-23.
," Id. at 38. The Court reasoned that, since the federal government had actually acquired the
disputed area vis-A-vis other nations and since protection and control of the area were functions
of national external sovereignty, the federal government's rights in the area were predominant. Id.
at 34. Using virtually the same reasoning, the Court reaffirmed California in United States v.
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and in United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), and extended
the area of federal paramountcy to submerged lands seaward of the marine three-mile belt.
Prior to these decisions, Louisiana and Texas had extended their boundaries, respectively, to 24
miles seaward of the marine three-mile belt and to the outer edge of the Continental Shelf. United
States v. Louisiana, supra at 705; United States v. Texas, supra at 720. In each case, the Court
held that, irrespective of such boundaries, the federal government has paramount rights in all
submerged lands seaward of the low-water mark on the following basis:
If as we held in California's case the [marine] three-mile belt is in the domain of the
nation rather than that of the separate States, it follows afortiori that the ocean beyond
1975] RECENT DECISIONS 583
In order to nullify the result of California, Congress passed the Submerged
Lands Act (SLA) s in 1953, which quitclaimed' to the states all land within a
"geographical" three-mile belt seaward of the tidelands.'" In the same year
Congress affirmatively asserted federal paramountcy over lands (hereinafter
outer lands) seaward of the quitclaimed area in the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA).' The federal government assumed this latter act con-
firmed its exclusive proprietary rights in the outer lands 2
The controversy since the passage of these acts focused on defining the scope
of the state-owned area acquired under the SLA. 23 However, the focus shifted
that limit also is. The ocean seaward of the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly
related to the national defense, the conduct of foreign affairs, and world commerce than
is the marginal sea.
Id. For a discussion of the Louisiana and Texas cases see BARTLEY, supra note 14, at 195-212.
Is 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970). The SLA was held constitutional in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S.
272 (1954).
" The United States has asserted in subsequent cases that the SLA granted, rather than quit-
claimed, these submerged lands to the coastal states. Note, Right, Title and Interest in the Terri-
torial Sea: Federal and State Claims in the United States, 4 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 463, 469
n.35 (1974).
" The SLA also quitclaimed submerged land beyond the geographical three-mile belt out to a
maximum of three marine leagues. To qualify for this extension, the state had to border on the
Gulf of Mexico and to prove in judicial proceedings that its boundary extended into this additional
area. SLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(b), 1312 (1970).
21 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) [hereinafter cited as OCSLA]. In effect the SLA and the OCSLA
sanctioned President Truman's 1945 proclamation that the natural resources of the soil of the
Continental Shelf are within the jurisdiction and control of the United States. Proclamation No.
2667, S. REP. No. 411, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 55 (1945). The Continental Shelf was subsequently
defined in a White House press release as referring to submerged lands continguous to coasts which
are covered by no more than 100 fathoms (600 feet) of water. White House Press Release of
September 28, 1945, reprinted in S. REP. No. 411, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 55 (1945). The definition
given in the OCSLA is more flexible in tliat it encompasses "all submerged lands [outside of state
ownership] . . . of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to
its jurisdiction and control. ... OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). Therefore, the shelf can
grow "6as the United States from time to time expands its jurisdiction and control therein either
unilaterally or by agreement with other nations." Stone, United States Legislation Relating to the
Continental Shelf, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 103, 107-13 (1968). See also Henri, The Atlantic States'
Claim to Offshore Oil Rights: United States v. Maine, 21 ENVIRONMENTAL AFF. 827, 837 n.47
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Henri].
I See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I, 9 (1960). The federal government sought a
declaration that it was entitled to exclusive possession of the lands, minerals, and other natural
resources in the Outer Continental Shelf lands.
I In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), the Court construed the SLA as expressly
confirming a geographical three-mile territorial boundary for all coastal states. In addition, the
SLA preserved the right of any state bordering the Gulf of Mexico to prove, in judicial proceedings,
boundaries in excess of three geographical miles but not in excess of three marine leagues. SLA,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(b), 1312 (1970); see note 20 supra. Gulf Coast States could thereby acquire
ownership of submerged lands outside the three-mile belt. The test is set forth in Louisiana, supra
at 27, which stated that "[slubsequent drafts of the bill introduced the twofold test of the present
Act-boundaries which existed at the time of admission and boundaries heretofore approved by
Congress."
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to the outer lands when the United States filed suit in the principal case, United
States v. Maine.24 Ruling in favor of the federal government, the Maine Court
adopted the findings of the special master who concluded that Calijornia,
United States v. Louisiana,5 and United States v. Texas 6 were controlling.27
In his view, these cases held as a matter of legal principle that the federal
government has paramount rights in the adjacent sea lands as attributes of its
jurisdiction over foreign commerce, foreign affairs, and national defense."8
Addressing the states' historical claims, the Court noted that one basis of
California had been that no ownership of the land under the three-mile belt was
acquired by the colonies from England." Moreover, it had held in United
States v. Texas,30 where the state did own land under the marginal sea prior
to joining the Union, that "such prior ownership nevertheless did not survive
becoming a member of the Union ... ."I' The Court decided that it "should
not undertake to re-examine the constitutional underpinnings" 32 of these
earlier decisions.
Furthermore, the transfer of land to the states under the SLA was an exercise
of federal paramountcy, not as the states contended, an act inconsistent with
such predominance.3 The SLA expressly declared that nothing therein af-
fected the rights of the federal government to the resources of the outer lands.34
The boundaries of Texas and Florida were established as extending three marine leagues (nine
geographical miles) from the coast, whereas Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama failed to estab-
lish a boundary beyond the geographical three-mile limit. United States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S.
502 (1960). California also failed. United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966).
In these and other cases, the Court sought to further define the quitclaimed area. See United
States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 11 (1969). In United States v. Calijornia,
381 U.S. 139, 165 (1965), the Court adopted the definition of inland waters used in the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S.
No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. Also, in determining subsidiary issues, 381 U.S. at 167-77, the Court
adopted the "ambulatory boundary" concept whereby a state may extend its seaward boundary
to cover new land created by artificial or natural accretions. Id. at 176-77; see United States v.
Louisiana (Texas Boundary Case), 394 U.S. I (1969); United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155
(1967); Taylor, supra note 1, at 368.
24 95 S. Ct. 1155 (1975).
- 339 U.S. 699 (1950); see note 17 supra.
- 339 U.S. 707 (1950); see note 17 supra.
2 95 S. Ct. at 1157-58.
' Id. at 1159.
20 Id. at 1158.
- 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
3, 95 S. Ct. at 1159. The Court stated that:
In deciding against [Texas], the Court did not reject the prestatehood rights of Texas
as it had the rights of the 13 original States in the California case. On the contrary, the
Court was quite willing to "assume that as a republic she had not only full sovereignty
over the marginal sea but ownership of it, of the land underlying it, and of all the riches
which it held .. " 339 U.S. at 717. Such prior ownership nevertheless did not survive
becoming a member of the Union . ...
32 95 S. Ct. at 1160.
Id.
3, SLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
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Congress could reserve these rights to the federal government only if it already
had paramount rights to the outer lands under the rule laid down in
California." Additionally, Congress "emphatically implemented" this view in
the OCSLA.6 In its conclusion the Court noted that the doctrine of stare
decisis had peculiar force in the context of this case. To adopt the states'
contentions, the Court would have "to disturb our prior cases, major legisla-
tion, and many years of commercial activity . . . -37 This action, the Court
decided, would be inappropriate 38
Maine has the legal effect of drawing a fairly definite 3  line between state
and federally owned submerged lands.4 0 The practical effect is to vest in the
federal government ownership of the Outer Continental Shelf's rich oil depos-
its" and potentially vast revenues. The coastal states are obviously unhappy
over the loss of these revenues,42 but from a purely legal standpoint their
historical claims to the disputed lands are without merit. The language- of the
charters under which the original states claim title is too ambiguous to allow
one to draw a definite conclusion. 3 However, the most logical construction
11 95 S. Ct. at 1161.
SId.
I d. at 1162. The Court stated that "[wie have long held that the doctrine of stare decisis
carries particular force where the effect of re-examination of a prior rule would be to overturn
long-accepted commercial practice." Id. at 1162 n.9.
Id. at 1162.
3, In United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 167-77 (1965), the Court adopted the ambula-
tory boundary concept allowing a state to extend its boundary seaward to cover new coastal land
created by accretions. See note 23 supra. Under this concept, the area of federally owned land could
become smaller:
The question arises whether the United States will take unfair advantage of its power
to prevent a state from constructing harbor-works into the sea, since such artificial
accretions will increase the state jurisdiction (and thereby decrease federal jurisdiction)
over offshore lands. But worse yet, the ambulatory nature of the boundary creates the
very uncertainty which should not exist in this area of delicate federal-state relationships.
Taylor, supra note 1, at 368. Hence, the line between marginal belt lands and Outer Continental
Shelf lands may be characterized as only "fairly definite."
1* Under the SLA only the Gulf Coast States had the possibility of extending their boundaries
past the geographical three-mile mark out to three marine leagues. See notes 20 and 23 supra.
Therefore, the Atlantic Coast States own only that land beneath the geographical three-mile belt,
and the federal government owns all the land seaward of this belt to the edge of the Continental
Shelf.
,l The Maine Court stated that:
The Outer Continental Shelf, since 1953, has yielded over three billion barrels of oil, 19
trillion m.c.f. of natural gas, 13 million long tons of sulfur, and over four million long
tons of salt.' In 1973 alone, 1,081,000 barrels of oil and 8.9 billion cubic feet of natural
gas were extracted daily ....
95 S. Ct. at 1162.
2 See TIME, March 31, 1975, at 84.
The coastal states were so bitter following the California decision that the offshore dispute
became an issue in the presidential campaign of 1952. See Taylor, supra note I, at 384.
," The charters of Virginia illustrate this point. The first charter of April 10, 1606, granted by
King James 1, purports to grant
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of this language indicates that the charters granted ownership of islands within
colonial boundaries, not of submerged lands." Furthermore, it can be strongly
and convincingly argued that England did not claim ownership of the subsoil
and seabed of any part of the Atlantic Ocean." Hence, the original states could
not have acquired ownership of these lands from England at the time of the
Revolution.
However, it is equally difficult to find justification for the federal govern-
ment's proprietary claim. Obviously, the government has the constitutional
power to acquire this land in fee,"6 but the manner in which it may do so is an
open question.' 7 The Maine Court adopted the theory, first expressed in
California,'4 that the United States acquired ownership as an attribute of the
exercise of external sovereign powers.4 Even though the federal government
has the duty of defending American rights in these lands against possible claims
of other nations, it does not necessarily follow that the government has also
acquired ownership of such lands.50 "It would be as logical to say, that to
exercise its powers of national defense or of regulation of commerce, the Fed-
eral Government needed a proprietary interest in the whole country."'' 5
all the lands soyle Groundes havens portes Ryvers Mynes Myneralls woodes Marrishes
waters Fyshinges Commodities and hereditaments whatsoever from the saide place of
theire firste plantacion and habitacion for the space of Fiftie like Englishe miles all
alongst the saide Coaste of Virginia and America towardes the Easte and Northeast as
Coaste lyeth together with all the Islandes within one hundred Miles directlie over
againste the same sea Coaste ....
Flaherty, Virginia and the Marginal Sea: An Example of History in the Law, 58 VA. L. REv. 694,
696 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Flaherty]. The second charter of May 23, 1609 granted
all the islands lying within one hundred miles, along the coast of both seas of the precinct
aforesaid; together with all the soils, grounds, havens, and ports, mines, as well royal
mines of gold and silver, as other minerals, pearls and precious stones, quarries, woods,
rivers, waters, fishings, commodities, jurisdictions, royalties, privileges, franchises and
preheminences, within the said territories and the precincts thereof, whatsoever, and
thereto and thereabouts, both by sea and land, being or in any sort belonging or apper-
taining ....
Id. at 697.
4 In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), the Court itself construed similar language
as granting islands only. The language construed was part of the definition of West Florida, ceded
by France to Great Britain in the Treaty of Paris of February 10, 1763. West Florida was described
as "bounded to the southward by the Gulf of Mexico, including all islands within six leagues of
the coast, from the river Apalachicola to Lake Ponchartrain. ... Id at 80; see Henri, supra
note 21, at 833-34; contra, Flaherty, supra note 43, at 697.
11 See Henri, supra note 21, at 834; Conflicting Claims, supra note 9, at 359-60.
40 Congress has the power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. The
power of the executive and legislative branches to acquire new territory was upheld in Wilson v.
Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907). See Conflicting Claims, supra note 9, at 362.
Conflicting Claims, supra note 9, at 362-64.
, 332 U.S. at 34.
" 95 S. Ct. at 1160.
so Conflicting Claims, supra note 9, at 364.
5, Id.
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It would appear that the government has a stronger claim by virtue of the
OCSLA. Although the Act does not expressly establish federal ownership of
the disputed lands, it sets up exclusive leasing procedures" and provides that
all revenues shall go into the federal treasury. s3 However, the Maine Court
agreed with the special master that the government had paramount proprietary
rights in these lands prior to the OCSLA.5
Whatever its basis, the Maine decision establishes federal ownership of the
outer lands to the total exclusion of the states. In view of the close balance of
power in Congress between coastal and noncoastal states,s" this solution may
prove to be politically infeasible. Just as Congress passed the SLA to deal with
California, it will probably enact legislation to deal with Maine. Indeed, the
political processes may be the best means for finally settling the dispute. 6
However, Congress is not likely to quitclaim title to the outer lands as it did
to the marginal belt lands in the SLA. 7 The probable congressional solution
will be to reassert federal ownership of these lands and then to provide some
percentage basis for dividing revenues earned from exploitation of the area
between the federal government and the coastal states. 8 This compromise is
the most realistic and justifiable solution, since it recognizes certain equitable
considerations in favor of the states" and is politically practical.
12 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334-35 (1970).
- Id. § 1338.
5 95 S. Ct. at 1161.
11 The 23 coastal states have a total of 46 Senators and 234 Congressmen. Note, The Federal-
State Offshore Oil Dispute, II WM. & MARY L. REV. 755, 767 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Oil
Dispute].
56 See Taylor, supra note 1, at 384-88. The author states:
The decision-makers in the United States . . . [were] confronted with a dispute on
or near the line between disputes which are capable of settlement by adjudication and
disputes which are nonjusticiable. The conditions for adjudication are neither minimal
nor are they optimal. In these circumstances, the responsibility for settling the dispute
should be borne by those processes of government most capable of achieving a satisfac-
tory result, namely the political processes of the federal and state governments.
Id. at 399.
11 At least one constitutional problem would result from such a quitclaim. If a state had control
further out to sea than the federal government, conflicts might arise due to the state's attempting
to dictate to the government matters outside the state's constitutional jurisdiction. Oil Dispute,
supra note 55, at 762. In addition, coastal states' ownership of these offshore lands would decrease
the revenues flowing to the federal government. The result would be a decrease in the revenue
available for distribution to the noncoastal states, thereby enriching the coastal states at the
expense of these inland states. Taylor, supra note I, at 390. One international consideration should
be noted. Allowing the states to claim more than three miles of seabed might stimulate excessive
claims by other nations. Oil Dispute, supra note 55, at 761.
- See Oil Dispute, supra note 55, at 768-70. See also Taylor, supra note I, at 372 n.86. While
the Maine Court never expressly advocates revenue sharing, it defines the federal government's
interest in the outer lands in terms of "paramount rights and power," which seems to avoid the
quality of exclusivity embodied in other terms like title and ownership. The Court appears to be
hedging in order to give the states some basis for broaching a claim to at least a portion of the
revenues from these outer lands.
11 Oil Dispute, supra note 55, at 764.
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Maine has established federal ownership of the outer lands, but has not
settled the controversy. The struggle for offshore oil revenues will continue. The
coastal states are unlikely to give up this struggle without another long fight.
Stephen O'Neal Spinks
